After offering a brief historical overview, this article presents a broad set of hypotheses in an effort to connect information to productivity. There are three contributions from this work. First, it distills observations from a diverse literature as prelude to exploring these theories empirically. Second, it applies two concrete models of information value, relating them to the economic definition of productivity, while considering how network structure influences information flow. Third, examples from an ongoing empirical study illustrate each hypothesis to give it practical significance. Interested readers may also test precise interpretations of these theories in an online simulation environment of networked societies.
"Productivity isn't everything, but in the long run it is almost everything" -Paul Krugman (1994)
Historical Context
Economists have long recognized the importance of productivity --increases in living standards depend almost entirely on increasing the output a worker produces with a given amount of input, including time. Historically, sustained productivity increases have been associated with the development of technologies underlying economic revolutions, such as the steam engine and electricity (David 1990 ). In the future, rates of productivity growth will determine whether living standards rise or fall as Third World economies mature and baby-boomers retire.
In the modern era, productivity growth in most industrialized countries proceeded at a moderate rate of about 2 percent from the 1870 -1950, increased to more than 2 percent from 1950 -1973 and then slowed considerably from -1993 (Castells 2000 . The combination of a productivity slowdown and rapidly increasing investments in information technology led to the "productivity paradox" of the 1980s and early 1990s (Roach 1987; Brynjolfsson and Yang 1996) . After controlling for factors such as energy price shocks and inflation, correlations between information technology investments and productivity remained negative or non-existent. On the flip side, in the past decade productivity has surged, even after sharp declines in information technology investments (Yang and Brynjolfsson 2003) . A considerable literature aimed at unraveling the seeming contradictory statistical relationship between information technology investments and productivity provides context for this article.
Our inquiry, however, pursues a different course. We focus on explaining how information management practices influence white-collar productivity. Examples from an ongoing study of executive recruiters illustrate our hypotheses and give them practical significance. Recasting Robert Solow's (1987) observation that "We see computers everywhere except the productivity statistics," we want to know how the information they gather, store, produce, and transmit makes us more effective?
At least four hypotheses have emerged to explain the productivity paradox (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1998) . The lag hypothesis focuses on the time required for the development and diffusion of new technologies (David 1990) . Under the lag hypothesis, it is only after costly investments in re-engineering and other complementary organizational practices and strategies that productivity gains would be expected (Greenwood 1997; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1999; Hobijin and Jovanovic 1999; Yang and Brynjolfsson 2003) . The needle in a haystack hypothesis emphasizes that although information technology investments increased rapidly, until recently they constituted such a small share of the overall economy that their influence positive or negative was unlikely to be measurable in aggregate statistics at the level of industries or nations (Oliner and Sichel 1994) . The competition hypothesis focuses on instances in which new technologies make consumers better off without increasing profits, which occurs when technologies fail to offer a competitive advantage for any single company (eg. Internet banking). Finally, the missmeasurement hypothesis points out that productivity gains from information technology investments often lead to changes in timeliness, quality, convenience or variety or the introduction of new products; only when these intangibles are quantified could productivity gains be seen (Griliches 1994; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; . In addition, if the effects of information technology are uneven, productivity increases might be visible at the firm level, but hidden in larger aggregates.
Studies since the mid-1990s have argued that investments in information technology do influence productivity Lehr and Lichtenberg 1999; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Oliner and Sichel 2000; Jorgenson 2001 ). These studies benefit from passage of time required for investments in information technology and its complements to accumulate as well as better measurement through more precise firm level analyses. Taken together, they lend statistical support to all four hypotheses, suggesting an affirmative answer to the question of whether information technology influences productivity at all.
The result has been to open debate on the larger question of how information technology might influence productivity. Some economists argue that productivity gains are limited to IT producing industries, such as semiconductors (Gordon 2000) . Others argue that while gains are concentrated in IT producing industries, as much as half may come from IT users (Jorgenson 2001) . Statistical support for the influence of information technology on service and white-collar occupations remains weak. Measuring output as an increase in the number of widgets produced is typically far more straightforward than gauging increases in the value of white-collar labor. Managerial output, for example, is often remote from the bottom line. However, the question of how information technology might contribute to productivity remains central to understanding what is significantly different about the Information Age.
Current literature offers a starting point. Productivity per information technology dollar varies widely, and may differ with clusters of technology, strategy and organizational practice. Findings in the literature correspond with mangers' conventional wisdom --it is not the presence of the technology itself that influences productivity, but how it is used. Our central question follows from this insight: specifically, how should information management practices influence white-collar productivity and what theories would explain these effects?
This analysis differs from earlier work on the relationship between computerization and productivity by focusing on how information and connectivity influence productivity as distinct from computer technology per se. The central question is approached from two distinct theoretical perspectives on information: the economics of uncertainty and computational complexity theory. Both theories are highly abstracted from social context and emphasize the thorough and rigorous development of results related to information and efficiency. But they ask different questions, use different tools and, most importantly, conceptualize information in different ways. We apply them here intending to inform organizational theory and with the hope of moving theory into practice.
In adopting a Bayesian view, Neoclassical economists consider only how information addresses the probabilistic "truth" of a proposition Roughly stated, the Neoclassical view of information and productivity is that if you could reduce uncertainty about the state of the world to zero then solutions to productivity puzzles would be obvious. In contrast, computational complexity theory asks first whether a problem can be solved, given an algorithm, encoding or heuristic. If so, theoretical interest then centers on determining an upper bound for the time it will take specific procedures to locate a satisfactory solution.
As the efficient use of information is unlikely to be independent of efficient structures for moving it, we combine these models with insights from network modeling. Hypotheses are extended such that topology and path length affect search and overload. Centrality and holes affect access.
The first section of this paper seeks to develop a common theoretical understanding by posing and addressing three questions: (1) What is productivity, (2) What defines the Bayesian and computational perspectives, and (3) What is the relationship between these perspectives and white-collar output.
The second section of the paper develops a dozen broad hypotheses governing factors such as information search, coordination, risk, push, sharing incentives, know-how distribution, and network topology. The scope is limited to consideration of theories explaining how information management practices might influence individual output. For clarity of focus, it does not address strategic uses of information in a game theoretic or political sense. 3 Such questions tend toward the distribution of surplus while our interest centers on how surplus is created. When information serves as an input, how does it connect to output?
To breathe life into theory and illustrate each hypothesis, practical examples are provided from an ongoing empirical study of output in the executive search industry. 4 Two firms are providing data that include six months of email communications, one year of accounting data, online surveys, and personal interviews. A third firm also provided surveys, interviews, and modest accounting data but ceased operations as an independent entity during this investigation. Survey response rates exceed 85% at three firms while email coverage exceeds 87% at two firms. 5 The virtue of executive search as a point of inquiry is that recruiting efforts involve complex white-collar professional tasks in a context where output is measurable and where information networks matter. Output can 3 Strategic uses of information are covered in literatures on game theory and industrial organization (Tirole 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) . On political uses of information within organizations, there is a separate literature; (cf. Davenport, Eccles et al. 1992) , and Markus (1983) . 4 We emphasize that illustrations here are either bivariate correlations or anecdotes based on interviews. Subsequent research will seek to introduce appropriate statistical controls. 5 Participants were paid $25 and $100 for surveys and for permission to capture email respectively. be measured in terms of revenue, duration, completion rate, and ability to multitask. Social networks also help recruiters ascend industry learning curves as well as identify and vet viable candidates.
What is Productivity?
In this paper, productivity refers to the definition of total factor productivity in economics: the difference between total real output product and total real factor input (Jorgenson 1995) . Changes in the values of product and factor input are separated into price and quality components. The definition is consistent with a summary measure of performance based on the ratio of the total value of output divided by the total value of input.
Following the economic theory of production, firms are assumed to possess a means of transforming inputs into outputs. Different combinations of inputs can be used to produce specific levels of output, and the production function is assumed to adhere to certain basic assumptions: Inputs and outputs are valued at market prices and investments in fixed factors of production are apportioned as shares of input across time.
Productivity increase is defined as an outward shift of feasible production (Figure 2 .b shows increased production with the same resources). This is the difference between the rate of growth of real product and the rate of growth of real factor input (Jorgenson 1995) . The rates of growth of real product and real factor input are defined, in turn, as weighted averages of the rates of growth of individual products and factors. A productivity increase is differentiated from substitution of factors due to changes in the relative prices of inputs, which is identified with movements along the production function (see Figure 1 ).
Economists also distinguish between productivity, profit, and increases in consumer welfare (for an empirical study, see Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996) . Depending on who enjoys the resulting surplus, a productivity gain may lead to an increase in firm profit, an increase in consumer welfare, or a combination of both. In a perfectly competitive market, all surplus from a productivity gain goes to the consumer. Innovations copied by competitors lead to price wars, which transfer surplus to consumers or providers of scarce resources. Consumer welfare increases, but profit does not (Teece et al. 1997) . For a productivity gain to generate profit, barriers to entry (Bain 1956; Porter 1980) or application (Barney 1991 ) must exist that prevent another firm from appropriating the source of the productivity gain. In the case of information, firms may be able to appropriate a productivity gain to earn profits as the result of legal protection (eg. patents and copyrights) or knowledge of a process that others are unable to reverse-engineer or otherwise imitate (e.g. trade secrets).
At the macro level of an economy, productivity may be roughly interpreted as a proxy for the standard of living. More precisely, productivity growth increases the potential for welfare, but is not an independent standard because it may be accompanied by positive or negative changes in the physical, economic and political environments, as well as the relationship between work and leisure (Griliches 1998, p. 368) . At the micro level of the firm, productivity metrics are used to benchmark performance against standards of market value (Sudit 1995) . Growth in labor productivity has been characterized as the foundation of the new economy (Castells 2001) .
Two Views of Information Use: Homo Economicus and Homo Computicus
In adopting a Bayesian framework, Neoclassical economics defines information as a change in uncertainty regarding the state of nature. Using the rational choice framework of decision theory, homo economicus begins with a priori estimates over a description of possible states. News contains information if it alters this prior belief. In this context, the value contributed by information is the difference between informed and uninformed choice Hirshleifer 1973) . For example, in choosing among job candidates, a successful recruiter's strategy may be conditional on contents of the resumÈs she receives when maximizing the value of her placed candidates. Information on a resumÈ has value if it leads to a better choice.
On the other hand, computational complexity theory considers information in both declarative and procedural forms. Declarative information provides the facts, a minimum description, or "entropy" necessary to describe the conditions of interest. Procedural information provides the rules, the know-how or instructions for changing the set of facts. Additionally, descriptions need not be finite and are typically orders of magnitude larger than those found in economics -for example, consider all of the possible permutations of values that could be stored in the memory of a modern PC. As a result, it is not uncertainty, but rather the complexity or computational costs of searching an enormous state space that concerns homo computicus. The value contributed by procedural information is the difference in value between the results obtainable by invoking rules from one knowledge base relative to that of another (Van Alstyne 1997). For example, successful recruiters have multiple methods for locating, evaluating, and placing job candidates. An information procedure has value if using it changes conditions for the better.
Intuitive notions that process knowledge contributes to productivity are widely recognized but rarely modeled. Hayek (1945) notes that "civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them"; evolutionary economics and organizational theory emphasize the contribution of "routines" (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963; Nelson and Winter 1982) ; corporate strategy speaks of "capabilities" or "competencies" (Wernerfelt 1984; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Barney 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992) . When procedural information is recognized within economics, it is most frequently modeled as accumulating stocks of knowledge spillovers without processes for logical inference. Examples include the endogenous growth theory literature of macroeconomics (Romer 1986; Adams 1990; Romer 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1998) and the industrial organization literature (Griliches 1986; Pakes 1986 ).
In terms of our recruiting example, computerization of the executive search industry has dramatically increased not only the searchable resumes on file -the facts -but also the methods for finding candidates and sharing knowledge about them -the processes. Each improves output in a distinct fashion, one by improving the quality of a match, the other by matching with less effort. If the goal is to tie information, its flows, its value, and its navigation to productivity, then we need models of how it changes both quality of output and also the input / output ratio. These perspectives can be visualized using an idea from the economic theory of production, in which a firm transforms inputs into outputs using the most efficient means at its disposal. In its most abstract form, this is represented by an efficient frontier -a production function boundary equating combinations of inputs that produce the same level of output ( Figure 1 ). Substituting inputs at efficient marginal rates only moves points along the frontier.
If risk and uncertainty lead to poorer decisions and hedging bets, then production lies away from the optimum. News and facts that reduce uncertainty move the firm towards increased efficiency. The best outcomes are increasingly achieved as present and future conditions are known with increasing certainty (Figure 2 .a). Consider hiring recruiters in one period for uncertain projects in the next. With too few projects, excess labor hours are wasted. With too few recruiters, projects are dropped and recruiters spread thin. News that reduces inefficiency moves a firm to the frontier.
While the economic view of production is coarse grain -a black box transforms inputs to outputs -the computational view is finer grain -modular routines can be rearranged to rearrange results. If rearranging resources creates a new result or uncovers an unknown cost reduction, then technological possibilities change. As more real value output results from an equivalent amount of real value input, it corresponds to the Neoclassical definition of a productivity increase: an outward shift of the efficient frontier ( Figure  2 .b). Across different recruiters, we found limited evidence of IT increasing the capacity to multitask projects and therefore carry a greater load. Multitasking is strongly
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Capital Input associated with increased output. If process knowledge of how to effectively use IT changes ability to multitask, it could change the production frontier.
Drawing from a base of different theory, each perspective emphasizes different aspects of how people use information. Economic models help understand questions of value and information as facts. Computational models help understand questions of efficiency and information as instructions. The former applies statistical inference to information problems. It employs decision theory and principal agency to characterize risk, search, and mechanisms for achieving efficient outcomes despite incomplete information.
Economists are also interested in how incentives affect production and information sharing. The latter, on the other hand, applies rule based logic to construct paths through a collection of problems. The computational framework considers modularity, robustness, search, and connectivity. It also extends logically to information flows and social networks.
In each case, more effectively navigating a pattern of information connections can raise productivity. Core information concepts are mediated by network structure so that topological models will inform our understanding of effective organization as information flows along channels determined by network structure. 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES Economic Perspectives on Organizational Productivity
A fundamental question economists ask is what makes information more or less valuable? While a rising relationship between quantity and value is typically assumed for physical goods, this relationship does not generally hold for information in a Bayesian sense, which considers the value of information in terms of a specific decision problem. Changing the problem changes the value (Marschak and Radner 1972) . More troubling is that adding new information can invalidate old information. Consider, for example, a job candidate whose credentials and accomplishments make him appear highly desirable, then add news of indictment for fraud. There is, however, one sense in which information is always more valuable within a Bayesian framework: more precise information (i.e more accurate or less noisy) is always at least as valuable as less precise (i.e. less accurate or more noisy) (1953) . 6 By definition, an information structure that represents another information structure at a finer level of granularity is more precise.
7 More precise information may increase productivity when it leads to more accurate matching of supply and demand (e.g. job candidates and clients) or reduces organizational slack and delay costs (Cyert and March 1963; Feltham 1968; Galbraith 1973 ). This can be stated formally as, Hypothesis 1: More precise information improves decisions by reducing waste.
In the executive search context, more precise information can refer to records that are updated monthly instead of quarterly or quarterly instead of annually. It can also refer to a candidate record that gives a specific department not just an organization.
Since the number of firms under study is small and all employees of a firm have access to the same records, we are unable to determine the exact effects of precision on performance. Differences in perceived accuracy, however, are observed in conjunction with increased employee happiness and also willingness to use the database. Both factors are observed in conjunction with increased performance.
More precise information also reduces risk. A risk-averse decision maker will pay a premium to insure against an arbitrary risk (Pratt 1964) . Risk aversion is normally assumed for investors -who seek insurance through diversification -and for employeeswho prefer fixed to unsure wages (for a survey see Eisenhardt 1989) . While firms and principals are traditionally assumed to be risk neutral, economists have increasingly recognized situations in which they may be risk averse as well, conditions that often relate to informational imperfections in capital markets, such as under-investment Stiglitz 2000) .
In addition to risk reduction through risk pooling in insurance and stock markets, the economics of uncertainty focuses on the design of mechanisms that address risks arising from information asymmetry in market exchange, such as adverse selection (precontractual information asymmetry) or moral hazard (post-contractual information asymmetry). The underlying idea is that efficiency gains can be realized through information mechanisms that prevent poor transactions or unnecessarily waste resources in the course of establishing mutually beneficial transactions. These include signaling mechanisms established by the party with the private information (eg. the seller of a used car offering a guarantee) and screening mechanisms established by the party attempting to ascertain the truth of private information (eg. a potential employer requesting educational credentials from job applicants) (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973) . Economic literature further distinguishes between one-shot and repeated contracts. In the latter, factors such as reputation can encourage trading and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior (Tirole 1988 ). More formally, Hypothesis 2: Information that reduces risk aversion increases productivity when it leads to actions that are closer to true risk neutral levels.
In executive recruiting, risk aversion could be associated with a preference for gathering as much information about a candidate as possible or a perception that there are severe costs from missing the right information. Recruiters who could "pull the trigger faster" on a candidate had weakly correlated higher completion rates but this was not statistically significant. We have not found significant relationships between these survey measures and output.
Economists' interest in the role of information frequently extends beyond a focus on the individual decision maker to an interest in how the structure of exchange relationships affects the ability of self-interested people to jointly achieve efficient outcomes. For example, the principle that co-location of a decision right with the most complete information promotes efficiency underlies economic arguments for conditions under which competitive markets promote efficient outcomes.
Within organizations, the importance of global factors favors data centralization since it promotes coordination and consistency. Examples include decisions involving organization-wide processes (eg. accounting, finance and legal services), integral aspects of design processes (Ulrich 1995) and crises in which rapid coordination is essential (Bolton and Farrell 1990) . Additional layers of hierarchical review may also be favored when costs of bad projects are high relative to the benefits of good ones (Sah and Stiglitz 1986) . Economically, centralization limits the costs of redundant systems, in terms of construction, maintenance and search. Technically, centralization is favored in terms of data integrity and enforcing a uniform standard (Van Alstyne, .
On the other hand, decentralization favors data gathering and adaptation. The argument follows from contract theory economics: owning an asset boosts incentives for maintaining and improving that asset. Conversely, not owning it discourages investing in that asset by reducing expectations of future gains since these must be negotiated with the owner (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990 ). With payoff uncertainty, then "to the owner go the spoils." Decentralized control improves incentives if disparate parties have indispensable information since they will be better positioned to use and maintain that information.
Applied to information management, contract theory offers the following results: (1) information systems that are independent of other parts of the organization should have decentralized control, (2) systems with complementary information should be combined under centralized control, (3) more indispensable agents should exercise greater control, (4) no distribution of control will induce optimal investment in situations involving both complementary information sources and more than one indispensable agent, (5) providing local copies may mitigate this problem at the risk of reintroducing fragmentation (Van Alstyne, . In case of conflicting design principles, a reasonable heuristic is to consider the investment motives of the party contributing both the greatest marginal and the greatest total value. Hypothesis 3: Centralized decisions promote decision consistency, global perspective, and avoid wasteful duplication. Decentralized decisions promote data gathering, distributed incentives, and adaptation. Productivity increases to the extent that distributing control optimally balances these factors in light of complementarity and indispensability.
In a recruiting context, project teams consist of a mix of one to four partners, consultants, associates, and research staff with two as the team mode. As a rule, the party with final decision authority is the one who landed the business. This is usually the senior party but most importantly it is the one with the client relationship. Thus ultimate authority is concentrated in the hands of the party with the client relationship, which can supercede seniority. Fact finding in teams, however, is decentralized.
Further, two firms decentralized the task of database entry for interview data to the recruiter who conducted it while the third centralized this function in research staff. The former practice led to inconsistent data entry based on more individualistic behavior but increased perceptions of control. The latter practice frees more time and allows recruiters to contact more people per day. These provide competing benefits as both database control and higher contacts per day correlate with revenues.
While allocations of information access and decision rights suggest a policy framework, they do not specifically address the question of how organizations motivate selfinterested individuals to proactively share information. Another economic principle --aligning incentives with outcomes encourages proper behavior --suggests that when organizational information sharing is desired, absolute incentives may have an advantage over relative incentives.
The intuition follows from a classroom grading example: under an absolute incentive scheme, every student who scores 90 percent or higher gets an "A." One successful student does not displace another but group study can lower individual effort. Under a relative scheme, the top 10 percent of the students get an "A" regardless of the actual score. Students are ranked relative to one another and may work hard to beat out other students. Assuming self-interested behavior, the former policy promotes sharing, while the later discourages it. An axiomatic model of this phenomenon is developed in Van Alstyne and while the motivation follows from Orlikowski's (1992) case study of groupware use in a competitive up-or-out consulting firm. Orlikowski found junior consultants refused to share information for fear of losing strategic advantage, while senior consultants, who were rewarded based on the absolute performance of the firm willingly shared information. The optimal incentive policy is hypothesized to depend on the degree of task interdependence, which correlates with increased information sharing.
Hypothesis 4: Absolute incentives encourage information sharing, which promotes group productivity; relative incentives discourage information sharing, but promote individual productivity. The optimal incentive policy in terms of productivity becomes increasingly absolute with increasing task interdependence.
Evidence from recruiter surveys correlate well with incentive theory predictions. Employees of the firm reporting the greatest weight on individual performance reported sharing the least information. Those of the firm reporting the greatest weight on team performance reported moderate information sharing. Those reporting the greatest weight on whole company performance reported the most sharing. No firm in the study employs more than 150 recruiters so these positive benefits may be contingent on firm size.
Having information, firms and individuals must decide what to do with it. Hirshleifer (1971) emphasizes that one valuable technique is to use "information push" to arbitrage supply of and demand for a resource. By predicting or causing future changes and controlling a key resource, one can disseminate news widely in order to profit from the shift. Such news resolves uncertainty over market opportunities and benefits those who acted early to control undervalued assets. This represents a classic example of reduced inefficiency as in Figure 2 .a and leads to:
Hypothesis 5: Information push benefits individuals and organizations that control undervalued assets (owners of overvalued assets incur losses). Efficiency increases when resource allocations rebalance to account for problems and opportunities
Empirically, two factors shed light on this thesis. First, individual recruiters who send more email and have more outbound contacts are weakly more successful in terms of revenues than those who send less email and have fewer outbound contacts.
8 Second, all firms do engage in a form of "information push" in that each will market news of an employment opportunity to prospective candidates in their databases. Rather like advertising, these techniques do appear successful and firms continue to invest in them.
Computational Perspectives on Organizational Productivity

Information sharing and the development of the knowledge base
While economic perspectives focus on the role of information in choosing between alternatives, computational complexity theory focuses on the efficiency with which procedural information is used to navigate through problem space. The value of an individual's knowledge base is assumed to be non-decreasing in the addition of new information, since procedures represent options that are only exercised when conditions are favorable (Van Alstyne 1997). Existing procedures can also be used in the creation of new procedures. It follows that sharing procedural information increases individual productivity by increasing the range of functions a person can perform.
Examples of procedural information sharing include informal know-how trading in which non-proprietary information is routinely exchanged based on norms of reciprocity (Von Hippel 1988) ; sharing through the networks of informal, professional or industry associations (Crane 1969; Saxenian 1994) ; and diffusion when the information is offered at little or no cost as a complement that enhances the sale of a product (Griliches 1958 ).
Hypothesis 6a: Know-how can increase productivity by creating new options for those who are unfamiliar with it. This includes options for recursively creating new process knowhow. Sharing disseminates these options.
Initial observations in a recruiting context provide interesting conflicting evidence on sharing and on what is shared. On one hand, individual recruiters report learning a great deal from colleagues about how to handle difficult cases, especially when they join the firm. Examples include disclosing information on candidate sexual orientation and unsubstantiated claims of sexual harassment, where stakes for candidate privacy or client liability are high.
On the other hand, survey respondents who claimed to share predominantly factual information in lieu of process tips appeared to complete more projects. This raises numerous unresolved issues concerning whether (i) procedural information is more difficult and time consuming to transfer, (ii) experts have encoded rules tacitly making them harder to express, (iii) people who withhold process knowledge benefit themselves at the expense of the firm, (iv) differences are really between seeking tips vs. volunteering facts as between questioner and answerer, and (v) style differences between managers who tell subordinates what they want versus how to proceed.
Procedural information often involves a tacit component. Difficulties of sharing tacit information are widely recognized. Research on the learning of skills suggests the transfer is greater the greater the overlap between components already acquired and those required for the performance of a new task (Singley and Anderson 1989) . Studies of technology transfer further suggest that when people are motivated to share information, the difficulty is typically related to the complexity of the information (Hansen 1999) . Two relevant dimensions of complexity are the level of codification (Winter 1987; Zander and Kogut 1995) and the extent to which information to be transferred is an element of a set of interdependent components (Teece 1986; Winter 1987) .
Efficiency gains accrue to the sharing of complementary information. If two people share no common understanding, each will be unable to connect information the other knows to anything they know how to perform. Likewise, a person that knows everything another person knows gains nothing by exchanging information. Stated formally, Hypothesis 6b: Optimal sharing occurs between partners with partial information overlap.
Within firms, interviews indicate that this would largely be true for peer-to-peer relations but self-reports of social network overlap show little correlation with performance. Rather status distinctions govern sharing: "Facts are shared in all directions. Methods flow downward. A partner would never ask an associate [consultant] 'How would you do this? '" 9 In moving from individual to organizational levels of analysis, connecting people holding different kinds of knowledge becomes important. Huber (1991) observes that organizations often do not know what they know. In economic terms, such missed opportunities often lead to failed economies of scale or scope.
Economies of scale arise because informational fixed costs (e.g. learning, the investment in creating a first copy) are often high relative to the marginal costs involved in repeating a procedure (Arrow 1974; Shapiro and Varian 1999) . Economies of scope arise when the joint cost of producing two different outputs is less than the cost of producing them separately. Informational economies of scope arise from indivisibilities in the application of a specialized knowledge base (Teece 1980) . Improvements may also take the form of either informing the uninformed or drawing new insights from bridging disciplines.
Divisions within an organizational knowledge base are termed balkanization, which can be measured empirically using similarity and distance metrics from information theory and graph theory measures of social networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 1996a; 1996b) . Stated formally as a hypothesis, Hypothesis 6c: Information sharing reduces balkanization, increasing productivity by promoting economies of scope and scale.
In the firms studied, individual contact networks within offices are not at all balkanized. Over any period longer than several weeks, contacts are dense and average email distance rapidly falls below two links to reach most people. Information sharing is more concentrated within industry sectors and within geographically dispersed offices than across these groupings. Importantly, recruiters with more contacts inside the firm, as measured by unique email correspondence, are observed in conjunction with higher output in terms of revenues, completion rates, and multitasking.
Utilizing the knowledge base
Organizational knowledge is a highly distributed resource. It can also be thought of as both a set of templates for action and a huge collection of facts. In this context, the productivity problem of allocating resources towards the highest value combination of actors, assets, and actions becomes one in which complexity overshadows uncertainty. Problem complexity increases so rapidly that answers become difficult even to enumerate.
Standards may increase productivity by reducing the range of complexity. They cut costs of monitoring, deliberation, and search. They promote economies of scale or scope in information processing and fostering network effects. At the same time, standards reduce information processing requirements by constraining potential interpretations.
Short run costs include those of recognizing, formulating and handling exceptions or the hidden costs of ignorance (Balakrishnan, Kalakota et al. 1995) . In the long run, deference to a standard can mask environmental changes. Once adopted, standards give rise to patterns of complementary investment. Economic implications include: path dependency, increasing returns, switching costs and network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Arthur 1989; David 1990; Liebowitz and Margolis 1990; Shapiro and Varian 1999; Shy 2001) . Following organizational adoption of a standard, economists often assume productivity will increase over time, although at a decreasing rate, which corresponds with empirical regularities seen in learning curves or learning-by-doing Epple, Argote et al. 1996) . In the presence of learningby-doing effects, a central microeconomic question for productivity analysis involves timing the switch to a potentially more efficient standard (Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996) . These factors highlight a tradeoff inherent in the adoption of informational standards:
Hypothesis 7a: Information routines and standards reduce complexity. They foster interoperability and sharing, but limit adaptation and flexibility. Optimal information standardization increases with decision stability.
In executive recruiting, standardization examples include interview forms for capturing candidate data, generation of new business leads, and routinization of data entry procedures by research staff. While the number of firms is too small for statistically meaningful firm-level conclusions, the firm with the most standardized practices on all three dimensions also had the highest per capita revenues, implying that such practices do matter.
While informational standards are applied to declarative information, standardization can also take place at the process interface. Modularity increases the number of independent processes, while standardizing interfaces between them. Dividing tasks into independent modules partitions the search space of potential designs, which can reduce the costs of experimentation and speed development by allowing design processes to operate in parallel (Fine 1998; Baldwin and Clark 2000 ).
Simon's (Simon 1996) parable of two watchmakers, Tempus and Hora, helps illustrate. Each watchmaker builds watches of 1,000 parts. Hora divides the task into subassemblies based on powers of 10, while Tempus does not. Interruptions by customers cause the watchmakers to lose any partially completed work -five steps on average in the case of a subassembly, but 500 steps on average otherwise. At the end of the day, Hora has built more than an order of magnitude more watches. The modular design proves significantly more robust. Stated formally as a hypothesis, Hypothesis 7b: Modular designs can increase productivity by spreading the risk of process failure or enabling new combinations of processes that extend the efficient frontier.
In terms of executive recruiting, tasks are modularly distinct for partners, consultants, and recruiters. For example, researchers specialize in generating contacts, consultants typically perform the initial screening of candidates, while partners interact directly with clients and are responsible for generating new business. This allows individuals to specialize in certain tasks and is reflected in our survey as differences in how recruiters spend their time that vary significantly more across job types than across firms. For example, researchers spend the most time in front of computers, while partners spend twice as much time as consultants interacting face-to-face. Job specialization also allows teams to constantly reform across engagements, which also encourages information spillovers across teams.
While informational standards and modularity both seek to limit the costs of transmitting information between processes, a more general tradeoff often exists between the information considered in transitioning between processes and the flexibility of response. Contingency and coordination theorists consider the properties of specific coordination strategies by identifying and analyzing tradeoffs that arise in managing the handoffs or interdependencies between activities (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973; Malone and Crowston 1994) ; while knowledge and resource-based theorists argue that the difficulty of replicating tacit aspects of coordination generates sustainable advantages in efficiency (Kogut and Zander 1992; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Kogut and Zander 1996; Barney 2001) . Stated formally as a hypothesis,
Hypothesis 7c: Coordinating information improves the efficiency of existing processes by reducing the number of bad handoffs and improving resource utilization rates.
Data in the recruiting context are inconclusive. Survey responses for those who used technology principally for coordination, as measured by scheduling and calendaring, appeared weakly less successful in terms of completion rates than those who also used database and search technologies. An absence of data on those who barely used either technology prevents better comparisons. The group using neither is represented largely by a handful of the oldest and most senior partners who also had staff perform these activities on their behalf. Comparisons between those who use coordination technologies alone and those who do not are therefore difficult to construct.
An example of the importance of coordinating information is the bullwhip effect observed in the "beer game." This is a well-known supply chain problem in which the volatility of demand and inventories becomes amplified the further one looks upstream from the consumer (Fine 1998; Sterman 2000) . Knowledge of this effect suggests ways to increase efficiency by compensating for lags in feedback or investing in information gathering that provides missing links in the chain between the supplier and the customer.
Volatility problems and nonlinear systems provide an examples in which simulation modeling is particularly effective in helping formulate strategies that are robust to system dynamics. In modeling, tacit conceptualizations of design problems are made explicit (Sterman 2000) . Simulations increase the potential for intra-organizational information sharing by acting as a boundary object between distinct communities of practice (Brown and Duguid 1998; Wenger 1998) . Simulations also increase favorable conditions for learning about problem structure by lowering the costs of learning and promoting feedback (Conlisk 1996) . Better decisions may result from a better sense of complex interrelationships between factors or a sense of the distribution from which outcomes are drawn as opposed to a particular draw sampled from experience (March, Sproull et al. 1991; Cohen and Axelrod 2000) . Stated formally as a hypothesis, Hypothesis 8: Simulation and modeling help decision makers more accurately identify leverage points within dynamic systems and reduce the cost of exploring alternative courses of action. They boost productivity by reducing wasted resources and creating new options.
No firm within the empirical study performed any simulation modeling. Data mining, to the extent it happened at all (cf Hypothesis 9 on information search), was limited to market trend analysis. The firm performing the most trend analysis was also the firm having more routine information practices and had the highest per capita revenues.
Information flows and network topologies
Organizational information management practices can also be analyzed by considering information flows and topologies. A network perspective is not specific to either the Bayesian or computational models. However, it can complement these frameworks by focusing on the economic importance of information in contexts involving search and deliberation.
Search is a process of scanning for news of the unknown or generating courses of action that improve on known alternatives. Search grows in importance when actors cannot independently or through market-mechanisms meet objectives in a cost-effective manner. Deliberation occurs when exchange is contemplated with unfamiliar partners or when evaluating untried courses of action. Deliberation grows in importance with the perception that potential downside effects of a decision miscalculation can be large and costly to reverse (Rangan 2000) .
Economic treatments of search typically focus on identifying optimal stopping points given uncertainty in parametric distributions (Stigler 1961; Diamond 1989) , while computational treatments emphasize algorithmic efficiency. A third factor focuses on the role of information flows and network topologies when search or deliberation are problematic (Watts, Dodds & Newman 2002) .
Structuring a solution space optimally involves grouping the possible choices into well balanced groups or trees such that, starting from scratch, a set of well asked questions can identify all choices in the lowest average time. In searching for job candidates, for example, criteria ought to cover all necessary attributes while not placing everyone in the same large pool. One would also not waste time by interviewing the weakest candidates first. If the criteria for search cannot be articulated in advance, then the problem itself is unstructured. Search then involves sampling broadly to discover important criteria before structuring the solution.
Hypothesis 9a: Efficient information search relies on structuring a solution to provide a balanced index, sorting choices to provide best options first, and stopping when the net expected value of the best unsampled choice no longer exceeds the best sampled choice.
In executive search, a recruiter establishes the set of search criteria in deliberation with the client. As the hypothesis suggests, the search then focuses on 4-6 sine qua non factors that are immediate deal breakers. The next half dozen factors are important but less critical, and the next dozen are factors that most reasonable candidates already have. The best matches involving "horse trading" among these weighted factors.
As it is not possible to examine every viable candidate, search terminates at the point of "throwing good money after bad."
10 This typically occurs after recruiters have established a clear picture of the specific candidate pool and interviewed enough candidates to defend their recommendations. No recruiter can "stand before God and claim to have contacted every conceivable candidate."
11 In terms of search efficacy, it also appears that recruiters who actively seek information are weakly more successful in terms of completion rates than those who wait for automatic processes to distribute it (local 'pull' vs. central 'push').
Globalization and technologies that reduce the costs of transmitting and manipulating information contribute to increasing rates of change in white-collar work. By definition increasing rates of environmental change increase uncertainty and shorten windows of opportunity, placing a premium on the role of information in search and deliberation. Rates of environmental change or clockspeeds are generally thought of in terms of cyclical frequencies. Product cycles are the most familiar, but cyclical patterns of transition from integral to modular arrangements may also be observed in organizational processes and structures (Fine 1998) . Conditional on an ability to adapt, organizations that match their information gathering to environmental change rates are hypothesized to be more productive. Stated formally, Hypothesis 9b: The optimal rate of information gathering and flow increases with the rate of environmental change.
Among the firms studied, the best example uncovered is a quasi-proprietary method for the automatic generation of new business leads. This process is tied to market factors that automatically generate more information as the market changes. It appears to be highly effective.
Information intensive strategies must inevitably contend with constraints on human information processing. Empirical research in psychology has led to a theoretical relationship between levels of arousal, which are typically influenced by information, and task performance. The Yerkes-Dodson Law considers two effects: an inverted "U" shaped relationship between arousal and the efficiency of performance and an inverse relationship between the optimal level of arousal for performance and task difficulty (Broadhurst 1959; Weick 1984) . Faced with overload, human coping mechanisms become more primitive in at least three ways: (a) reversion to more dominant, first learned behaviors, (b) patterns of responding that have been the most recently learned are the first to disappear, (c) novel stimuli are treated as if they are similar to older stimuli (Staw, Sandelands et al. 1981) . In other words, overload focuses on attention on preconceptions at a time when needs for accurate sensing of current conditions are perceived to be greatest. Chronic overload also decreases productivity through fatigue. Stated formally, Hypothesis 9c: Optimal information gathering balances the costs of overload against the costs of ignorance.
Reports among recruiters of information overload are observed only very weakly in conjunction with reduced output factors such as completion rates. As measured in the limited sense of email volume, perceived overload also has very low correlation with actual email received. It is possible that recruiters experiencing less overload have developed better coping strategies that allow them to handle greater volume. At present, no clear connection between perceived and actual overload -with effects on performance -has been established.
When search or deliberation is problematic, organizations that are better able to address crucial informational gaps through the structures of their information networks may be more productive. One potential tradeoff seeks to balance access to key information sources in times of urgent need against sources that may provide novel domain specific expertise.
Empirical observations of organizational communication networks suggest some interpretations. In the context of innovation, sparse networks rich in weak ties may provide the latent links needed to spot new opportunities, while strong ties characterized by repeated interactions may be needed to transfer complex knowledge (Hansen 1999) . Focusing on key sources may be favored in contexts where deliberation takes precedence over search, in the sense that the trust needed to evaluate another's opinion depends on shared history. We state the tradeoff formally as, When surveyed about having multiple sources for critical information, partners who disagreed were observed in conjunction with higher revenues and more completed searches. This appears to speak more to the novelty of sources than the novelty of links to a particular source. Not surprisingly, novel sources appear valuable. As measured by larger in-bound email contact networks, those with more links were observed in conjunction with higher revenues and more completed searches.
Social network theorists have paid particular attention to relationships between social structure and economic opportunity (Granovetter 1973; 1985; Burt 1992; . Granovetter emphasizes the importance of weak ties, while Burt focuses on the importance of bridging structural holes, defined as a gap between two communities with non-redundant information. Burt considers the return on investment from social capital flowing from three sources: access, referrals and timing.
With respect to social networks, bigger is hypothesized to be better, since information about new opportunities is time dependent and flows through existing contacts. However, consideration of opportunity costs in the face of bounded rationality leads to Burt's suggestion that players optimize social networks by focusing on maintaining primary contacts within non-redundant communities, so as to maximize access to information from secondary sources.
Burt's theory of structural holes is a theory of competitive advantage that follows from social capital. Although the emphasis is strategic, parties that occupy structural holes might theoretically increase productivity in two ways. The first explanation can be conceived in economic terms as a form of informational arbitrage, in which profits or social status are realized through personal relationships, but the end result is a more efficient allocation of resources. For example, Baker (1984) documents the extent to which social network topologies of floor traders dampen the volatility of options prices within a national securities market. The second explanation can be conceptualized as realizing economies of scope and scale in the face of balkanization. In this case, information about an opportunity is transmitted across a structural hole, while the actual creation of new value follows from subsequent information flows. Examples include: Hargadon and Sutton's (1997) ethnographic analysis of brainstorming practices that facilitated the brokering of technological expertise within a design firm ; Powell et. al's (1996) analysis of relationships between intra-organizational collaboration patterns, profitability and growth in biotechnology; Saxenian's (1994) ethnographic account of regional differences between Route 128 and Silicon Valley; and Castells ' (2000; 2001) portrait of a network society, in which productivity gains are attributed to the abilities of self-programmable human labor to continuously reconfigure around opportunities in a globally interconnected world.
Hypothesis 11: Network efficiency balances network size and diversity of contacts. Network effectiveness distinguishes primary from secondary contacts and focuses resources on preserving primary contacts. Individuals who are more central will be more effective.
In terms of email communications, three contact measures calculated on more than 40,000 messages for recruiters included "betweenness," "centrality," and "in-degree." These can be interpreted both for individual nodes and for their contacts' contacts. All three were correlated and all three were observed in conjunction with higher output as measured by revenues and completion rates at statistically significant levels.
Optimal network structure might balance efficient information sharing across strong ties and identification of opportunities across structural holes. A network topology that theoretically combines these desired properties is the "small world" topology (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Watts 1999) . The small world is defined by two measures: characteristic path length (the smallest number of links it takes to connect one node to another averaged over all pairs of nodes in the network) and the clustering coefficient (the fraction of neighboring nodes that are also collected to one another).
An explanation for this effect is that adding only a few shortcuts between cliques turns a large world into a small world. Using formal models, Watts and Strogatz shifted gradually from a regular network to a random network by increasing the probability of making random connections from 0 to 1. They found characteristic path length drops quickly whereas the value of the clustering coefficient drops slowly. This leads to a small-world network in which clustering is high but the characteristic path length is short.
Importantly, however, we emphasize small worlds characterized by clustering and short paths apart from the randomness of connection that is only one way of shortening distance. Shortcuts can be intentional. Kleinberg (2000) points out that although random graphs may have shortcuts, individual agents will typically have insufficient information to exploit them. Since the average person (node) is not directly associated with the key people (clique-linkers), it is impossible to determine whether you live in a small world or a large world from local information alone. However, the small world hypothesis can be tested through the collection of network data. Stated formally, Hypothesis 12: The small world pattern of high local clustering and short average path lengths promotes productivity more than either hierarchical or fully connected networks.
Among recruiters, modal email communications across nodes were highly interconnected over any time period longer than one month. It appears that for most project teams, communications within the firm were many to many with respect to recruiters outside the team but within the organization. The firm with the shortest average path length (1.5 vs. 1.9) generated the most revenue per recruiter. However, as no organization studied numbered more than 150 employees, relatively short path lengths may also imply that information overload is not yet a binding consideration.
Conclusions
Empirical evidence that investments in information technology positively influence productivity has renewed longstanding debate among economists over the sources of productivity growth. We argue that complexity of the relationship between information and productivity necessitates approaches that transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries and acknowledge contributions from economics, complexity, and network theories.
Our argument begins by linking theoretical notions for valuing information as data and process to the economic definition of total factor productivity. Formally recognizing the economic value of information as process opens the door for integrating theory from multiple traditions.
A main contribution of this work is to codify predictions of various theories and connect them to white-collar productivity. One set of theories considers questions of value and information as facts. The economic tradition connects information to output via risk, precision, push, search, standards, and incentives. Another set of theories helps understand efficiency and information as instructions. Computational and network models connect information to output via topological efficiency, modular design, standards, centrality, modeling, and search.
While relationships between information and productivity are clearly complex, they should be amenable to testing and validation. Along this line, a second contribution of this work is to provide a glimpse of how each hypothesis might be interpreted and applied. In the specific context of executive search, absolute incentive systems track information sharing, larger social networks are observed with more revenues and higher completion rates, routines correlate with revenue, decentralized data entry parallels perceptions of information control, and centrality seems connected to revenue. Although anecdotal in nature, these illustrations from a continuing multi-year study point to the means of probing these predictions further.
Empirical verification of hypotheses will undoubtedly involve considerable ingenuity in generating suitable controls and translating predictions of theory into precise measures of information use and human interaction. This process is ongoing. The greater promise, however, lies in the potential to not only reflect on patterns of organization as they exist, but to generate new lines of research that actively informs business practice in light of the opportunities offered by continuing advances in information, network, and communication technologies.
